T his paper develops a theoretical account of the reconstruction of workforce downsizing as a shareholder-value strategy since the 1980s. This account has two components. First, building on resource-dependence theory, I suggest that growing corporate dependence on institutional investors makes firms susceptible to their demand for greater returns, especially when these institutional investors are blockholders and resistant to counter-pressure from managers. Second, building on Fligstein's theory of conceptions of control, I suggest that the rise of shareholder value reorients managerial behavior, by changing the decision context in a way that induces managers to maximize shareholder value. Crucial to constructing this new decision context are a set of agency-theory prescriptions for reforming corporate governance. My analysis of downsizing announcements, drawing on a sample of 714 US firms between 1981 and 2006, shows that both the pressure from institutional investors and the new decision context encourage firms to downsize more frequently. By demonstrating how both pressure from investors and changed managerial decision contexts have contributed to the prevalence of workforce downsizing, this paper makes a strong case for the financialization of the American corporation, and contributes to the sociological research on growing job insecurity and income inequality over the past three decades.
Emerging in the 1980s, the shareholder-value paradigm of the firm-the notion that the only legitimate goal of the corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth-has brought significant changes to the corporate governance and strategy of major US corporations (Davis 2009; Fligstein 2001) . Relatively less well understood are its broad social and political implications, especially for class dynamics in the American workplace and the distribution of wealth and resources among investors, managers, and workers. Prominent scholars of employment relations have called for more research on how the rise of the shareholder-value paradigm has led to the disintegration of the postwar business-labor social contract, under which employees of large American companies in primary business sectors have enjoyed a fairly high degree of job security and career stability (Kalleberg 2009; Osterman 1999) .
One salient indication is the increasing prevalence of workforce downsizing, which has significantly eroded job and income security for middle-and workingclass Americans. Previous studies have linked this recent development to the rise of the shareholder-value paradigm (Budros 1997; Fligstein and Shin 2007; Hirsch and De Soucey 2006; Useem 1996) , but evidence of this link has not yet been conclusive. For instance, Budros's (1997) study, one of the best empirical works on this issue thus far, shows that a decline in a firm's stock price triggers downsizing, suggesting that pressure from shareholders for greater returns induces firms to downsize. Similar patterns, however, have been observed in contexts where shareholder-value orientations are not widely accepted, such as Japan in the 1980s (Kang and Shivdasani 1997) . Although it does seem likely that the shareholder-value paradigm has brought about this new form of downsizing, it still remains unclear by what processes this has occurred.
In this paper, I aim to develop a fuller account of how the shareholder-value paradigm has contributed to the prevalence of downsizing. This account has two components. First, building on resource-dependence theory, I suggest a mechanism of coercion, which operates through the power of external resource providers to impose their preferred management paradigms upon firms (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Prechel and Morris 2010) . Since the 1980s, large US firms have become increasingly dependent on institutional investors for capital flow. As a result, they have become vulnerable to institutional investors' demands for greater returns, which may induce them to downsize more frequently (Useem 1996) . This kind of resource-dependence argument has been frequently made but rarely directly tested. This paper provides a thorough empirical test for the argument. In conducting this test, however, I find that the resource-dependent argument does not hold in its simple form; that is, not all institutional investors are equally capable of pressuring firms to downsize. Instead, I show that only blockholding institutional investors (those that hold a large block of a firm's stock) or pressure-resistant institutional investors (those that are invulnerable to counter-pressure from managers) exert such influence.
My second and equally important claim identifies a mechanism of persuasion, which encourages managerial acceptance of the shareholder-value paradigm. Even after taking into account the different levels of influence that different types of institutional investors hold, external coercion alone is unlikely to explain the prevalence of downsizing. Before the 1980s, managers engaged in downsizing only reluctantly (Budros 1999) because, at that time, expanding the size of a firm was the hallmark of successful management. The recent prevalence of downsizing suggests that managers have changed their attitude toward downsizing and have embraced it as a value-enhancing strategy. Hence, building on and extending Fligstein's (1990 Fligstein's ( , 2001 ) theory of conceptions of control, I suggest a second mechanism that facilitates managerial acceptance of downsizing as part of the shareholder-value paradigm. Shifts in the dominant management paradigm reshape the behavior of managers, I argue, by changing what I term decision context-the context in which managers make important decisions. In the present case, the rise of the shareholder-value paradigm has led to a new decision context, one in which managers have strong incentives to maximize shareholder value. Crucial to constructing such a decision context has been a set of prescriptions for reforming corporate governance, prescriptions that were originally formulated by agency theorists in the field of financial economics and that were thereafter promoted by institutional investors (Dobbin and Jung 2010) .
My analysis of downsizing announcements, drawing on a sample of 714 large, publicly held US firms between 1981 and 2006, shows that both pressure from institutional investors and the new decision context encouraged firms to downsize more frequently. These findings establish a strong link between the rise of shareholder value and the recent prevalence of downsizing. They suggest that under pressure from certain types of institutional investors and within the changed decision context, shareholder-value-oriented managers have reinvented downsizing as a strategy to manage shareholder value and to signal to investors their commitment to increasing value. By demonstrating these firm-level processes that have led to the rise of downsizing as a shareholder-value strategy, this paper contributes to the sociological research on growing job insecurity and income inequality over the past three decades.
Workforce Downsizing as a Shareholder-Value Strategy
In the 1980s, the postwar business-labor social contract began to disintegrate. Previously, employees of large American firms in primary business sectors had enjoyed a fairly high degree of job security and career stability (Kalleberg 2009 ). Employers and unions together had set the rules governing various aspects of employment relations, including wages, benefits, working hours, and job descriptions (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1994) . These formal and informal rules, however, had come under severe strain beginning in the late 1970s. Faced with fierce foreign as well as domestic competition, US companies experienced a severe drop in profitability and thus were less willing to make concessions to labor (Baumol, Blinder, and Wolff 2003; Osterman 1999) . The rise of shareholder value further accelerated the collapse of the postwar business-labor social contract. In response to investors who demanded maximum returns on their investment, employers attempted to drastically revamp their postwar employment practices (Harrison and Bluestone 1988; Kalleberg 2009; Kochan 2012) .
The prevalence of downsizing is one salient indicator of the revamping of postwar employment practices (Osterman 1999) . In the new political economic context that emerged in the 1980s, downsizing was reconstructed as a strategic means to enhance a firm's performance (Budros 1997; Fligstein and Shin 2007; Lazonick and O'Sullivan 2000) . This was a significant change from the past, when firms laid employees off temporarily during downturns (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1994) . Instead, firms today cut jobs permanently in both good and bad times, as a strategy to maximize profits. In a book that popularized the business-process-reengineering movement, Hammer and Champy (1993) championed downsizing as an effective means to eliminate non-value-adding work and thus to achieve immediate cost savings. Allured by this prospect, poorly performing firms have engaged in massive downsizing in order to achieve a quick turnaround.
Even strongly performing firms downsize to boost share price and satisfy shareholders. In 1997, Kimberly-Clark eliminated 5,000 jobs in a bid to push the company closer to achieving management's goal of doubling earnings per share between 1995 and 2000 (Langreth 1997 ). In another example, Dell Computer, after failing to meet Wall Street analysts' earnings forecasts for the fourth quarter of 2000 (earning 18 cents per share when securities analysts had expected 25 cents per share), announced its intention to cut 1,700 jobs to improve profit margins (Gaither 2001) . In yet another example, Alcoa planned to cut 6,700 jobs in 2006; while the company made record earnings in the first three quarters of that year, the CEO stated that the company needed to take the "difficult but necessary" steps to move forward (Glader 2006) . In all of these examples, the firm's intention to boost its share price is apparent; this thus clearly illustrates that downsizing has been firmly established as a shareholdervalue strategy.
Two Explanations: Resource Dependence and Decision Context
What accounts for this transformation of workforce downsizing as a shareholdervalue strategy? Both resource-dependence theory and Fligstein's theory of conceptions of control provide crucial explanations. Building on them, I develop a theoretical account of how external pressures from institutional investors and a changed within-firm decision context since the 1980s have induced managers to pursue downsizing in their attempt to enhance shareholder value.
Resource Dependence and External Pressure from Institutional Investors
Resource-dependence theory suggests that external resource providers can exert considerable influence over an organization (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) . Capital-dependence theory, a variant of resource-dependence theory, applies this fundamental argument to the analysis of the modern corporation, focusing on "corporations' historically contingent capital-dependent relationship to the political, economic, and ideological dimensions of their institutional environment" (Prechel 2000, 10) . According to the theory, a crucial feature of capital dependence since the 1980s has been "the change from debt to equity financing" (Prechel and Morris 2010, 341) . Heavy corporate reliance on equity financing has empowered institutional investors, who have come to control a large block of a firm's stock (Davis 2009; Useem 1996) . "This historical contingency," Prechel and Morris argue, "increased institutional investors' power, which in some respects made corporate management more vulnerable to external influences" (Prechel and Morris 2010, 341) . Unlike banks, which expect simply that a debt be repaid, institutional investors have pressured corporate management to enhance profits and stock performance.
Hence, it is argued, firms may be more likely to engage in downsizing to enhance profits under the oversight of these investors (Useem 1996) . Although few studies have directly tested this relationship between institutional investor pressure and downsizing in the United States, Ahmadjian and Robbins's (2005) study demonstrates that increased ownership by foreign institutional investors (mostly from the United States) contributed to the prevalence of downsizing in Japan during the 1990s. If institutional investors exert influence abroad, they should have similar or even greater influence at home, where the politico-legal environment is considered more permissive of job cuts (Weiler 1990) . Although this is a plausible prediction, however, there has also been considerable skepticism about the ability of institutional investors to impose substantive strategic changes in the face of managerial resistance. While a firm's dependence on institutional investors may be a necessary condition for the latter's influence over the former, it may not be a sufficient one. Indeed, previous studies suggest that there can be considerable variation across different types of investors in terms of their ability to influence management (Coffee 1991) .
There are two main sources of this variation. The first is the size of holdings. Several studies have cast doubt on the ability of institutional investors to impose substantive reforms on firms, for most of them hold only a small portion of a firm's stock and may thus be reluctant or unable to challenge management (Coffee 1991; Davis and Kim 2007) . Instead, it is suggested, only blockholding institutional investors have both the power and the incentive to challenge managers (Hartzell and Starks 2003; Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Tosi and GomezMejia 1989) . In addition, unlike smallholders, blockholders cannot simply vote with their feet when dissatisfied with management, because it is hard to liquidate large chunks of shares without further depressing stock value (Coffee 1991) . Hence, when stuck with an underperforming firm, blockholding institutional investors are often left with a voice option; that is, pressuring managers to restore profitability (Hirschman 1970) .
The second main source of variation is institutional investors' vulnerability to counter-pressure from managers. Some institutional investors are pressuresensitive, that is, vulnerable to such pressure, while others are pressure-resistant. Resource-dependence theory suggests that the influence of external resource providers is limited to the extent that the resource-dependence relationship is mutual (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) ; that is, when external resource providers are also dependent on the organization as a key transaction partner. In fact, certain institutions have actual or potential business relationships with firms, which makes them vulnerable to counter-pressure from managers (Brickley, Lease, and Smith 1988; Coffee 1991; David, Kochbar, and Levitas 1998; Davis and Kim 2007) . For instance, commercial banks and insurance companies are least willing to challenge corporate management, because they may lose business with the firms (Coffee 1991) . Mutual funds have a similar conflict of interest, because some of them (e.g., Fidelity) sell pension instruments to companies (Davis and Kim 2007) . Unlike these institutions, public pension funds have little to no opportunity to earn fees or income from companies.
Blockholding and pressure-resistant institutional investors have indeed pressured management to enhance returns on their investment, using various tactics such as private lobbying, anti-management proposals, and proxy contests (Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach 1998; Gourevitch and Shinn 2005; Useem 1996) . Pressure from such investors often, if not always, results in significant leadership and organizational changes (Jung 2014; Useem 1996) . The role of the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) in the ouster of Robert C. Stempel, the former CEO of General Motors, is a well-known example (Lohr 1992) . Under such pressure, firms are likely to initiate drastic restructuring, including downsizing, in order to enhance profits and restore investor confidence. CEOs have acknowledged the existence of such pressure. Robert J. Eaton, the former CEO of Chrysler, said that downsizing occurred more frequently as a result of the pressure put on firms to increase short-term profits, by institutional investors who came to control large stakes (Meredith 1996) . I expect that although such investors may not specifically ask firms to downsize, their demand for greater returns on their investment can still encourage firms to engage in downsizing. 
New Decision Context and Reorientation of Managerial Behavior
While resource-dependence theory suggests a mechanism of coercion for downsizing, through pressure from institutional investors, Fligstein's (1990 Fligstein's ( , 2001 theory of conceptions of control suggests a mechanism of persuasion, through reorientation of managerial behavior toward shareholder-value maximization. Fligstein (1990) posits that, at each historical moment, there is a dominant model of the firm, one that defines the relationship among key stakeholders and strategies that firms should pursue in the interests of these stakeholders. Fligstein (1990) further suggests that shifts in the dominant conception of control reorient the behavior of firms and managers. Such shifts affect the intra-firm power bases of different managerial groups, pushing to the top those with strategic orientations and expertise most congruent with the prevailing conception of control.
Extending Fligstein's explanation, I suggest that a shift in the dominant conception of control can also lead to reorientation of managerial behavior through the efforts of external groups to change the decision context in which managers make and implement key strategic decisions. I argue that this process better 1981Q1 1981Q4 1982Q3 1983Q2 1984Q1 1984Q4 1985Q3 1986Q2 1987Q1 1987Q4 1988Q3 1989Q2 1990Q1 1990Q4 1991Q3 1992Q2 1993Q1 1993Q4 1994Q3 1995Q2 1996Q1 1996Q4 1997Q3 1998Q2 1999Q1 1999Q4 2000Q3 2001Q2 2002Q1 2002Q4 2003Q3 2004Q2 2005Q1 2005Q4 2006Q3 Average Percent Shares Held by Institutions
Less than 1% Between 1% and 5% More than 5% 1981Q4 1982Q3 1983Q2 1984Q1 1984Q4 1985Q3 1986Q2 1987Q1 1987Q4 1988Q3 1989Q2 1990Q1 1990Q4 1991Q3 1992Q2 1993Q1 1993Q4 1994Q3 1995Q2 1996Q1 1996Q4 1997Q3 1998Q2 1999Q1 1999Q4 explains how the rise of the shareholder-value paradigm has reshaped the behavior of managers in general and their behavior with respect to downsizing in particular. Unlike previous shifts in the dominant conception of control, the shift to the shareholder-value conception did not just trigger intra-firm power struggles among managers. The shift also intensified tension between managers who were mostly interested in enlarging the size of firms and shareholders who wanted maximum returns on their investment. The declining profitability of many large US firms in the 1970s stimulated emerging power groups in financial markets such as institutional investors to promote new corporate strategies for restoring profitability (Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley 1994; Useem 1996) . They imposed such strategies upon management using their market power, but they also did so by changing the decision context in a way that induced managers to pursue profit maximization and thus to voluntarily implement those strategies, including downsizing. Agency theory, a branch of financial economics, played a crucial role in constructing this new decision context. Agency theorists asserted that managers, who typically hold little stake in the firm, have insufficient incentive to maximize returns to shareholders (Fama 1980; Jensen and Meckling 1976) . According to them, in the 1960s and the 1970s, managers of large US firms were busy diversifying their firms to further expand the size of their empires and to raise their salaries, without increasing shareholder value (Amihud and Lev 1981; Jensen 1986) . As a remedy for these problems, agency theorists called for broader governance reforms to ensure that managers would pursue value maximization.
Three such reforms became prominent. First, in order to minimize agency costs, agency theorists prescribed that managers should become shareholders: "If the manager of a firm owned 100 percent of the firm's shares, then . . . the decisions made by that manager would be presumed to be those that maximize long-run shareholder value . . ." (Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck 2004, 21) . While this is practically impossible, a board could still tie the wealth of the firm's executives to that of shareholders, for instance by granting executive stock options (Jensen and Murphy 1990) . Agency theorists also attributed the agency problems of the 1960s and the 1970s to the failure of an internal monitoring system-the board of directors (Jensen 1993, 862) . As a remedy, they called for boards to be composed mostly of independent, outside directors. Finally, agency theorists argued that firms should increase financial transparency, so that investors could assess their prospects (Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck 2004) . To that end, management consultants advised firms to have a financial specialist on the top management team-a chief financial officer (CFO), who would take charge of increasing transparency, by regularly communicating with analysts, holding conference calls, and making earnings preannouncements (Zorn 2004) .
All three agency-theory prescriptions mentioned above have been widely adopted by firms since the 1980s, as can be seen in figures 2 through 4. Now, a significant portion of executive compensation is equity-based, through stockoption grants. 1 There have also been improvements in board monitoring, in that most boards are now dominated by outside directors. Finally, almost 90 percent of firms in my sample had a CFO in the early 2000s, whereas less than 20 percent did in the early 1980s. One important reason that firms have embraced agency-theory prescriptions is active advocacy by institutional investors. While putting direct pressure upon firms to boost profits, they have also sought to improve the broader corporate governance structure of firms, by pushing for a set of agency-theory prescriptions (Dobbin and Jung 2010). 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 I argue that in the changed decision context following the three agency-theory prescriptions, managers have strong incentives to cut costs by downsizing. Previous studies have shown that equity-based compensation practices create incentives for managers to pursue profit maximization (Zhang et al. 2008; Sanders and Hambrick 2007) . Hence, firms with option-loaded chief executives may more frequently engage in downsizing as they aim at greater profits. Studies have also shown that independent boards are more likely to fire CEOs of poorly performing firms and replace them with outsiders (Weisbach 1988) . Monitoring by independent boards may thus lead managers to become increasingly focused on profit maximization, which in turn may induce them to downsize. Finally, whereas financial managers once performed back-office functions like bookkeeping and preparation of tax documents, as CFOs they are deeply involved in making key strategic decisions. They have pushed for strategies that, they believe, cut costs and thereby boost profits. Downsizing is one such strategy.
Hypothesis 2-1: Stock-option grants to CEOs will increase the rate of workforce downsizing.

Hypothesis 2-2:
Board independence will increase the rate of workforce downsizing.
Hypothesis 2-3:
The presence of a CFO will increase the rate of workforce downsizing.
Additional Explanations
In addition to my resource dependence and decision context explanations, there are other cultural-institutional and organizational explanations for the prevalence Percent with the CFO position 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 of downsizing that have been suggested by previous studies. These explanations capture additional mechanisms that contribute to our understanding of how the rise of shareholder value has led to the prevalence of downsizing.
CEO functional backgrounds
According to Fligstein (1990 Fligstein ( , 2001 , the functional background of CEOs can shape their strategic orientations, including their acceptance of the shareholdervalue paradigm. For example, he suggests that although CEOs with financial backgrounds in the 1960s and the 1970s pursued a conglomerate strategy, the next generation of finance CEOs applied their expertise to cost cutting and financial reorganization in the changed economic and political environment of the 1980s (Fligstein 2001) . But it remains uncertain whether firms managed by CEOs with financial backgrounds are most likely to engage in downsizing. Instead, Budros (2002, 322) suggests that firms managed by CEOs with operations backgrounds are more likely to engage in downsizing, because such CEOs "typically possess experience in administration and divisional general management and thus know how to orchestrate such large-scale changes as downsizings."
Taken-for-grantedness of downsizing
In addition to shareholder-value orientations at the firm level, the degree to which downsizing becomes taken for granted can affect a firm's propensity to engage in downsizing. Institutional theory posits that organizations adopt taken-for-granted practices to maintain legitimacy vis-à-vis key institutional constituencies (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977) . Hence, when a significant proportion of organizations in a particular field have adopted a particular structure or practice, the rate of adoption for other organizations will also increase. In the present case, before the 1980s, large-scale downsizing was regarded as a last-ditch effort to save a gasping venture, but as more firms, even prominent ones, engaged in downsizing, it came to be seen as "business-asusual" (Budros 1999, 78) . Budros (1997) demonstrates that the prior adoption of downsizing plans by peer companies accelerates the likelihood of downsizing by the focal firm.
Restructuring, corporate strategy, and hostile takeovers
Other firm-level restructuring events and strategic changes can trigger downsizing. First, downsizing may accompany mergers and acquisitions (M&As) to consolidate operations and shed excess capacity (Budros 1997; Fligstein and Shin 2007) . For instance, Martin Marietta, a major aerospace firm, announced its plan to cut 9,000 jobs after it acquired GE's aerospace electronics business in 1993. Two years later, Martin Marietta and Lockheed merged, and the resulting company, Lockheed Martin, decided to eliminate 12,000 jobs to "consolidate" their operations. This and many other similar cases suggest that downsizing is likely to occur as part of post-M&A restructuring, together with other measures of consolidation such as asset divestiture. Corporate strategy may also affect a firm's propensity to engage in downsizing. Firms pursuing a focused strategy, instead of a conglomerate strategy, may shed jobs in non-core businesses. Finally, proxy contests for control may induce incumbent management to engage in restructuring to fend off such an attempt (Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley 1994) . A detailed case study of a Fortune 500 firm by Dencker (2009) suggests that hostile takeover bids can lead to drastic reorganization, including downsizing, by targeted firms. Studies based on such samples may suffer from survivorship bias, because these samples become biased toward successful firms in later years. To overcome this problem, I sampled firms evenly across the entire period so as to include firms in growing as well as declining industries. I sampled systematically, within industries, with replacement when a firm already appeared in the sample. The sampling frame is Fortune's list of America's largest firms. I stratified the sample by industry, selecting a roughly equal number of firms from 23 industries. 2 The majority of industries (16 out of 23) were sampled exclusively from the Fortune Industrial 500. For the remaining industries-communications, utilities, transportation, wholesale and retail, service, healthcare, and entertainment-I used specialized Fortune lists of the 50 largest firms in these industries. For entertainment and healthcare, I also used Dun & Bradstreet's Million Dollar Directory for years before 1983, at which point Fortune began to cover these industries.
Data and Method
Sample
Dependent Variable: Downsizing Announcements
I collected information on the history of downsizing announcements for the firms in my sample. Following Budros (1999) , I define downsizing as permanent personnel reduction. This definition excludes announcements of temporary layoffs and sales of assets. Data on downsizing announcements were obtained through extensive archival search. The primary source was the LexisNexis electronic database. The database catalogues most major newspapers, such as the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, as well as local ones, and several newswire services. I searched for each firm in my sample individually, using keywords such as "downsizing," "job cut," and "layoff." After removing cases that referred to downsizing plans announced earlier, 5,843 unique announcements were identified. An issue with this measure of downsizing is that some announcements may not lead to actual reductions in employment for various reasons. While this is an important limitation, the current measure still captures the expressed intention of firms to reduce their workforce.
Independent Variables
I have two sets of key explanatory variables, one for the resource-dependence explanation and the other for the decision-context explanation. A firm's dependence on institutional investors is measured by the percentage of the firm's shares held by institutional investors. Data on institutional ownership were obtained from Thomson Financial. To compare the influence of blockholding and smallholding institutional investors, I divide the overall institutional ownership into three parts: the percentage of shares owned by blockholders (those holding more than 5 percent of a firm's stock), another by intermediate holders (those holding between 1 and 5 percent), and finally one by smallholders (those holding less than 1 percent). The sum of these three variables does not total 100 percent because the portion owned by individual investors is not included. The 5 percent threshold for blockholders has been widely used in other studies (e.g., Hambrick and Finkelstein 1995; Salancik and Pfeffer 1980; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1989) . In a similar fashion, to compare the influence of pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive institutional investors, I divide overall institutional ownership into five parts: percentages of shares owned by different legal types of institutions, including banks, insurance companies, investment companies (i.e., mutual funds), investment advisors, and public pension funds. Among them, the first three-banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds-are often regarded in the literature as pressure-sensitive, while public pension funds are seen as pressure-resistant. The remaining category, investment advisors, is not clearly defined in the literature as fitting in either category exclusively, so I leave it as an indeterminate category. Obviously, both sets of institutional ownership variables cannot be included in the same model because they are divisions of the same overall institutional ownership variable. Hence, I have separate models-one for holding size and another for legal type. I construct another set of measures for agency-theory prescriptions to account for the changed decision context. First of all, the extent to which a firm's CEO is compensated with stock options is measured using the ratio of stock options to total compensation. I also include total CEO compensation because it often increases with stock-option grants and may also affect the rate of downsizing. Because Compustat's ExecuComp database, from which I collected CEO compensation data, began to report stock-option values, calculated using the BlackScholes-Merton method, in 1992, I explore the effects of CEO stock options and compensation in separate models, with a one-year lag, for the years between 1993 and 2006. Second, board independence is measured by the percentage of outside directors on the board. Outside directors are defined as any directors who are not employed by the firm. Finally, the presence of a CFO is measured by a binary variable, coded as one when a firm has a CFO. Data for the last two variables were taken from Standard & Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives. In addition to the key explanatory variables for the resource-dependence and the decision-context explanation, I include another set of explanatory variables in order to account for the additional cultural-institutional and organizational explanations. First, the functional background of CEOs is coded primarily based on their prior positions and educational backgrounds. Such information was collected primarily from Who's Who in Finance and Industry. For instance, CEOs who served in accounting or finance-related positions, such as treasurer, controller, or CFO, are regarded as having a financial background. In addition to the indicator variable for financial backgrounds, two additional indicator variables for engineering or production and operations backgrounds are added. The remaining backgrounds, such as administrative and legal ones, are omitted as a baseline category. Second, the extent to which downsizing is taken for granted is captured by the density of downsizing at the industry level, which is calculated as the percentage of firms within the focal firm's industry, minus the focal firm, that announced downsizing plans in the previous year. Finally, a set of variables are included to account for the effects of restructuring, corporate strategy, and hostile takeovers. The amount of M&A activity is measured as the number of M&A deals completed in the previous quarter. The data were obtained from SDC Platinum. 3 Also included is the number of asset divestitures completed by the focal firm in the previous quarter. These data were also from SDC Platinum. A given firm's pursuit of a focused strategy is measured by the degree of diversification. I use the entropy index of diversification, which is calculated as Σp 
Control Variables
I include several control variables that have previously been shown to affect a firm's decision to downsize. The data for most of these variables were obtained from Compustat. For operating performance, I include return on assets (ROA). For stock-market performance, I include cumulative stock returns over three months (change in share price). Investment in new technology is measured using a firm's net expenditure in property, plant, and equipment (PPE) per employee. Debt burden is measured by debt-to-equity ratio. Several measures of macroeconomic and industry-level circumstances are also included. Industry growth rate is measured as the percentage change in the aggregate sales for each 2-digit SIC industry the firm operates in. Aggregate sales were calculated using information for all companies in Compustat. Quarter-to-quarter changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) tap overall macroeconomic conditions. An indicator variable for recessionary periods (1990-1991 and 2000-2001) is included. An annual time-trend variable is included to capture the effect of any unmeasured secular trends. Last but not least, a measure of unionization at the industry level is included in order to account for possible resistance from labor unions against downsizing (Hirsch and Macpherson 2003) . quarterly. In either case, they are lagged so that they reflect the state in the previous year or quarter.
Missing Values and Multiple Imputation
For some financial variables, missing values are of concern. The most severe case is the ROA variable; for about 15 percent of all quarterly intervals, this information is not available. For all other variables, the rate of missing data is less than 5 percent. When data are missing for non-random reasons, listwise deletion can yield biased estimates (Allison 2002) . To address this problem, I estimated missing values for these variables using a multiple imputation program, Amelia II (King et al. 2001) . Results are robust to the exclusion of quarterly intervals for which there are missing data.
Modeling Procedure
I use continuous-time event history analysis to analyze the rate of downsizing announcements. For each announcement made by firms in my sample, I obtained information on the exact date of its occurrence. Hence, the metric for duration time is day, which is sufficiently fine-grained for continuous-time models. Event spells are defined as the time intervals between announcements, and the duration time is reset to zero whenever an event occurs. For most firms founded before 1980, their first spell is left-truncated. For each lefttruncated spell (457 announcement-spells), the beginning is set to January 1, 1980 . Since this procedure can lead to biased estimates, I conduct a robustness check by estimating models without such spells. This procedure is commonly suggested as a robustness check for the problem of left-truncation (Singer and Willett 2003) .
I use the Cox regression model for estimation, which is a widely used method for continuous-time event history analysis. One important advantage of the Cox model over other parametric models is that one does not have to choose some particular probability distribution to represent survival times. Without having much prior knowledge, any choice of the functional form for the baseline hazard function would be arbitrary. Instead, the Cox model lets the data determine the shape of the hazard function (Singer and Willett 2003) .
The repeatability of the event under study requires special treatment; there can be dependence among the multiple observations from the same unit, arising from unobserved heterogeneity (Allison 1995, 240) . To address this issue, I use the fixed-effects Cox model, which lets announcement-spells from a firm share the same baseline hazard function. Allison (1996, 220) suggests that, under conditions of moderate censoring, the fixed-effects models are more suitable for handling repeatable events than conventional single-event models. Fixedeffects models cannot include time-invariant variables such as industry dummies; however, such variables are implicitly controlled for. Another important shortfall is that they drop subjects with no events, that is, subjects with only a single right-censored spell as well as those with one uncensored spell and one censored spell, if the censored spell is shorter than the uncensored spell (Allison 2005, 116) . For the present case, 148 firms were excluded for these reasons. To see if excluding them affects the results, I conduct another robustness check, using an alternative random-effects Cox model-the Cox model with the frailty term, which does not exclude firms experiencing no event (BoxSteffensmeier and Jones 2004) . Finally, tied events are handled using the Efron method (Efron 1977) . 1980Q4 1981Q3 1982Q2 1983Q1 1983Q4 1984Q3 1985Q2 1986Q1 1986Q4 1987Q3 1988Q2 1989Q1 1989Q4 1990Q3 1991Q2 1992Q1 1992Q4 1993Q3 1994Q2 1995Q1 1995Q4 1996Q3 1997Q2 1998Q1 1998Q4 1999Q3 2000Q2 2001Q1 2001Q4 2002Q3 2003Q2 2004Q1 2004Q4 2005Q3 2006Q2 Frequency of Downsizing Announcements GDP Percent Change model fit over that of baseline models. In the following, I first discuss the results for the entire observation period between 1981 and 2006 in table 3 , testing all hypotheses except hypothesis 2-1 about CEO stock options, and then discuss the results for the subperiod from 1993 in table 4, focusing on hypothesis 2-1 and changes observed between the entire observation period and the subperiod.
Results
Hypothesis Testing: The 1981-2006 Period
First of all, the results in table 3 support the resource-dependence hypotheses. In model 2, overall institutional ownership is negatively related to the rate of downsizing, which is contrary to the resource-dependence argument that firms heavily dependent on institutional investors are likely to downsize more frequently. This significant negative effect of institutional ownership, however, conceals considerable variation across different types of investors. The first source of variation is the size of their holdings, as predicted by hypothesis 1-1. In model 3, I replace overall institutional ownership with ownership by blockholding, intermediate holding, and smallholding institutional investors. As I have predicted, ownership by blockholding institutional investors significantly increases the rate of downsizing, whereas ownership by smallholding institutional investors significantly decreases it. A similar kind of variation is observed for pressureresistant and pressure-sensitive institutional investors, as predicted by hypothesis 1-2. In model 4, I replace overall institutional ownership with ownership by five different legal types. As expected, ownership by pressure-resistant institutional investors, that is, public pension funds, significantly increases the rate of downsizing, whereas ownership by pressure-sensitive institutional investors, especially banks, significantly decreases it. While the considerable amount of variation across different types of institutional investors and the positive effects of ownership by blockholding and pressure-resistant institutional investors support my predictions, the negative effects of smallholding and pressure-sensitive institutional investors require some explanation. Do these negative effects suggest that such investors do not want firms to downsize and lobby managers not to do so? It seems unlikely that smallholding or pressure-sensitive institutional investors could pressure firms not to downsize. What seems more likely is that they sell off shares of firms shortly before downsizing announcements, because rumors about possible downsizing announcements often widely circulate in the financial community. Hence, smallholding and pressure-sensitive institutional investors may abandon firms even before downsizing plans are publicly announced.
The results in table 3 also support two of the decision-context hypotheses about the effects of board independence and CFOs. They show that firms adopting these agency-theory prescriptions engage in downsizing more frequently. First, models 5 and 6 support hypothesis 2-2 that firms with outsiderdominated boards engage in downsizing more frequently. Given that the average board had, on average, 12 directors during the study period, replacing one inside director with an outside director (i.e., about an 8 percent increase 
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Coef. in board independence) increases the rate of downsizing by about 7.5 percent. 4 Models 5 and 6 also support hypothesis 2-3 that firms with CFOs engage in downsizing more frequently. Specifically, having a CFO increases the rate by about 13 percent.
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CEO
Hypothesis Testing: The 1993-2006 Period
Moving to the results covering the 1993-2006 period, models 5 and 6 in table 4 support hypothesis 2-1 that a firm engages in downsizing more frequently when a significant portion of the CEO's compensation is equity-based through stock-option grants. The coefficient for the ratio of stock options to total CEO compensation is significantly positive in both models. Specifically, every 1 percent increase in the ratio of stock options increases the rate of downsizing by roughly 0.36 percent. Note also that the overall level of CEO compensation is negatively associated with the rate, suggesting that it is primarily the equity component of the compensation package that induces the CEO to cut costs by downsizing.
The results of hypothesis testing remain substantively the same for most other hypotheses. One exception is hypothesis 2-3 about the role of CFOs. In models 8 and 9, the coefficient of the CFO variable becomes only marginally significant at the 10 percent level. Hence, compared to equity-based executive compensation and board independence, there is weaker evidence for the effect of CFOs. It seems that the presence of a CFO no longer indicates the shareholder-value orientation of a given firm, as almost all firms in the sample adopted the position toward the end of the 1990s.
Additional Explanations
Results in tables 3 and 4 provide considerable evidence to support the additional sociological explanations of downsizing. First, there is some evidence that the functional background of CEOs matters. The results in table 3 show that firms with CEOs with financial backgrounds are most likely to engage in downsizing compared to those with other functional backgrounds. This positive effect, however, becomes insignificant in the period after 1993, as shown in table 4, suggesting that CEOs with other functional backgrounds also embraced downsizing. There is much stronger evidence for the effect of the industrylevel taken-for-granted of downsizing. The density of downsizing within a focal firm's industry significantly increases the frequency of downsizing by the focal firm.
There is also considerable evidence that other firm-level restructuring events and strategic changes can lead to downsizing. First, downsizing is highly likely after M&As. When there was a merger or acquisition in the previous quarter, the rate of downsizing increases by more than 60 percent. Similarly, downsizing is likely after asset divestiture, another type of restructuring. Firms pursuing a focused strategy are more likely to engage in downsizing; in other words, highly diversified firms downsize less frequently, but this positive effect of diversification becomes insignificant in the period after 1993. It seems that diversified firms came under pressure to streamline their operations in the 1990s, once the diversification strategy fell out of fashion, which happened in the 1980s (Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley 1994) . Finally, there is evidence that firms that become a target of hostile takeover attempts are more likely to engage in downsizing. But this positive effect of hostile takeover bids also becomes insignificant in the period after 1993. This is mainly because very few hostile takeover attempts occurred after the 1980s.
Control Variables
A number of control variables show the expected effects. First, declines in both operating and stock-market performance increase the rate of downsizing. Quite naturally, firms with a large workforce are more likely to engage in downsizing, but firms with large assets are less likely to do so. Downsizing occurs more frequently in declining industries and economic downturns, especially during recessionary periods. Finally, union coverage has no significant effect on the rate of downsizing. Its coefficient has a positive sign but is not significant. This insignificant result may reflect two competing forces. Labor unions have attempted to prevent or delay job cuts, but at the same time management has taken more confrontational approaches and withstood union resistance to downsizing (Osterman 1999) .
Robustness Checks
As mentioned earlier, I conduct two robustness checks. First, I replicate models in tables 3 and 4 without 457 left-truncated event spells whose beginning is set to January 1, 1980 Second, I replicated models in tables 3 and 4 using the random-effects Cox model, which include event spells from 99 firms with no downsizing announcement events and an additional 49 firms with only one uncensored event but whose censored spell is shorter than the uncensored one. The results are presented in appendix B (available in the supplementary materials online). In this case, the results are very similar to the main results in tables 3 and 4.
Conclusion
In this paper, I provide a theoretical account of the transformation of workforce downsizing as a shareholder-value strategy, building on two prominent theories in organizational sociology-resource-dependence theory and Fligstein's theory of conceptions of control, respectively. Building on resource-dependence theory, I suggest that firms' growing dependence on equity financing makes them vulnerable to pressure from institutional investors, and that such pressures lead firms to downsize more frequently in their attempt to enhance stock performance. However I further suggest that their direct pressure may be limited to the extent that they are vulnerable to pressure from management and their ownership is dispersed. The results of my analysis support my argument. Ownership by blockholding institutional investors significantly increases the rate of downsizing, and so does ownership by public pension funds, which, compared to other types of investors, are least vulnerable to pressure from management.
Second, further developing Fligstein's theory of conceptions of control, I suggest that the rise of the shareholder-value paradigm of the firm has reshaped the behavior of managers with respect to downsizing, by constructing a decision context in which firms and their executives are induced to jump on the downsizing bandwagon. For most of the twentieth century, managers had little incentive to pursue shareholder-value maximization, but the diffusion of various agencytheory prescriptions has created a decision context in which managers view the maximization of shareholders' wealth as in their own interest. Thanks to executive stock-option grants, executives have a greater stake in increasing share price. Monitoring by independent directors means that executives face an increased risk of losing their jobs if they fail to satisfy shareholders and the stock market. The rise of CFOs as second-in-command to the CEO further infuses the shareholdervalue orientation into the top management team, especially before the late 1990s, when the position became a taken-for-granted feature of most US corporations. The results of my analysis suggest that these agency-theory prescriptions presage the rise in downsizing by altering the context of managerial decision-making.
By demonstrating the influence of institutional investors and shareholdervalue-oriented managers on the decisions by large US firms to downsize, this paper makes a strong case for the financialization of the American corporation (van der Zwan 2014). Previously, professional managers literally monopolized the authority to determine key strategic decisions (Berle and Means 1933) , but this kind of managerialism has recently been challenged. Since the 1980s, power groups in financial markets have exerted significant influence over important corporate decisions (Dobbin and Zorn 2005) . Given the corresponding power shift within corporations to executives responsive to shareholder demands, US firms have placed a low priority on human resources relative to financial and shareholder considerations (Kochan 2012) . As a result, firms downsize more readily than they had previously, in order to raise the price of their stock immediately, even though it remains uncertain whether this strategy will improve long-term viability (Cascio, Young, and Morris 1997; De Meuse, Vanderheiden, and Bergmann 1994) .
The firm-level causes of downsizing examined in this paper demonstrate the importance of synthesizing the organizational literature on firm behavior and the labor-market literature on job security and income inequality (Kalleberg 2009; Morris and Western 1999; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011) . Apparently, the growing popularity of downsizing as a strategy for managing profits and share price has significantly increased the sense of insecurity among ordinary working-and middle-class Americans (Hacker 2006) . Those who lost their jobs as a result of plant closings or large-scale layoffs often find it hard to acquire another job (Osterman 1999) , and their jobs are often replaced with nonstandard work arrangements (Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson 2000) . The findings of this paper also complement recent sociological studies on income inequality that focus on inter-class power dynamics among investors, managers, and labor (Kristal 2013; Shin 2014; Western and Rosenfeld 2011) . While these studies attribute the growing income inequality to the declining bargaining power of organized labor, the present paper draws attention to the other side of the process-the growing power of investors and the alignment of managerial and investor interests.
The findings of this paper also contribute to the broader organizational literature. First, the role of institutional investors in promoting downsizing highlights the importance of power in shaping organizational decisions. Although power had been one of the key concepts in organizational theory, even before resource-dependence theory (e.g., Cyert and March 1963) , the role of power has not received sufficient attention. In particular, studies informed by institutional theory tend to underplay its importance (DiMaggio 1988; Mizruchi and Fein 1999) . Because of this prior neglect, more research is needed about the role of power in shaping organizational action and outcomes. Power should play a particularly important role in explaining institutional change, as political struggles among interest groups can undermine an existing institutional order (Friedland and Alford 1991) . This paper provides an important case, by illustrating how the influence of institutional investors has contributed to reformulating the prevailing norm of employment relations at large US corporations.
Second, the important role played by agency theory in shaping the context of managerial decision-making demonstrates the role of economic theories in constructing organizational practices. Both institutional theory and performativity theory (Callon 1998; Mackenzie and Millo 2003; Strang and Meyer 1993) suggest that economic theories may be translated into management innovations and then rendered true, as managers and market participants behave as if those innovations actually work. But at the same time, the findings of this study suggest that this kind of translation of theory into practice does not occur automatically; instead, the process and its results depend significantly on the power of actors who promote a certain theory. In the present case, managers did not act according to agency theory merely because they were convinced by the theory, but because they were pressured to by institutional investors, particularly blockholders and public pension funds.
Before concluding this paper, it is important to acknowledge some limitations of this study and potential areas for future research. One important limitation is the role of labor unions. Recent studies suggest that the decline of labor unions has been an important factor behind various changes in employment relations and income distribution since the 1980s (Bidwell 2013; Kristal 2013; Shin 2014) . The same can be said for the prevalence of downsizing; the insignificant effect of labor unions in my analysis may reflect this. But my analysis uses industry-level data on labor unions, and one might see a different result using firmlevel data. Using such data, future research may explore various mechanisms through which workers can resist downsizing decisions and their implementation. Another limitation is the potential impact of offshoring. There has been considerable academic as well as public debate about offshoring and job losses at home (Brady and Denniston 2006) . It is likely that offshoring triggers or follows downsizing decisions, but it is difficult to prove without good firm-level foreign direct investment (FDI) data. Several firms in my sample, mostly textile firms, refer to offshoring as a reason for downsizing at home, but most firms do not specify reasons for downsizing. Future research may explore sources of firm-level data on offshoring and examine its impact on downsizing decisions.
Notes
current research explores how the growing influence of the financial sector has reshaped corporate strategies and employment practices of large US firms since the 1980s.
